What the &*$% is Moral Turpitude?
Filed Under (Admissibility, Immigration and the Federal Courts) by Joe on 10-02-2010
I saw this in an opinion published today by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals – Ocegueda Nunez v. Holder – regarding the age-old question: what exactly is “a crime involving moral turpitude?”
“Once again we face the question of what is moral turpitude: a nebulous question that we are required to answer on the basis of judicially established categories of criminal conduct. Although that may not be a satisfactory basis for answering such a question, it is the role to which we are limited by precedent as a court of law. Furthermore, any answer based on other considerations would in all probability be unacceptable to one or another segment of society and could well divide residents of red states from residents of blue, the old from the young, neighbor from neighbor, and even males from females. There is simply no overall agreement on many issues of morality in contemporary society.”
Nice. The 9th Circuit has no clue what moral turpitude is. Judge Reinhardt goes on to write that “[w]e have previously discussed at some length the inherent ambiguity of the phrase “moral turpitude” and the consistent failure of either the BIA or our own court to establish any coherent criteria for determining which crimes fall within that classification and which crimes do not. See, e.g., Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 909 (” ‘[M]oral turpitude’ is perhaps the quintessential example of an ambiguous phrase.”); id. at 921(Berzon, J., dissenting) (“[T]he BIA’s precedential case law regarding the meaning of the phrase ‘crime involving moral turpitude’ . . . is a mess of conflicting authority.”)…”
Wow – absolutely NO ONE knows how to define moral turpitude. The Court concludes that the only real way to decide whether a crime involves moral turpitude is to compare it to crimes that have already been found to involve turpitudinous conduct – and yes, that really is a word. With this as its test, the Court held that California Penal Code § 314, which criminalizes indecent exposure, is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because some of the conduct it punishes might lie outside the generic definition of moral turpitude.
Aside from providing some nice quotations, this case nicely illustrates just how big a headache statutory language can cause the legal system. This ambiguity could have been intentional – an example of Congress having something in mind, but not knowing exactly how to define it, and dumping the problem on the courts instead – but it could just as likely have been poor legislating on the part of whoever came up with “moral turpitude” as the definition for “bad crimes” in immigration law. I would have Congress scrap moral turpitude as a legal standard altogether, but is there even another way to define the class of crimes Congress intended to identify in this situation? Moral turpitude might unfortunately be as good as it gets. I guess that not every concept in law corresponds with a clear, unambiguous definition – and that we have to resign ourselves sometimes to sorting out those “messes of conflicting authority” Judge Reinhardt was talking about.